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Abstract
The notion that perception involves Bayesian inference is an increasingly
popular position taken by many researchers. Bayesian models have provided
insights into many perceptual phenomena, but their description and practical
implementation does not always convey their theoretical appeal or concep-
tual elegance. This tutorial provides an introduction to core concepts in
Bayesian modelling and should help a wide variety of readers to more deeply
understand, or to generate their own Bayesian models of perception. Core
theoretical and implementational issues are covered, using the 2 alternative-
forced-choice task as a case study. Supplementary code is available to help
bridge the gap between model description and practical implementation.
Keywords: Bayesian network, Bayesian inference, alternative forced choice,
MCMC, ideal observer, psychometric function, probabilistic generative
model.
1. Introduction
The question of how our perceptions derive from sensory observations
of the world has been long debated. One popular position is that our per-
ceptions arise from unconscious inferences (Helmholtz, 1856), with Gregory
(1980) suggesting that perceptions are hypotheses about the world. Under
this view, in contrast to the claims of Gibson (2002), sensory data are am-
biguous and prior knowledge or Gestalt-like assumptions about the world
are required to make accurate perceptual inferences (Pizlo, 2001). Because
Bayesian inference provides a recipe for optimally combining prior knowledge
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with new sensory observations, it has the potential to provide significant in-
sight into perception (e.g., Knill and Richards, 1996; Kersten et al., 2004).
Determining the extent and limits of these insights is, and will be, an im-
portant task. In doing so, it is clear from recent discourse (e.g., Bowers and
Davis, 2012a; Griffiths et al., 2012; Bowers and Davis, 2012b) that clarity is
required in conveying the details of, and theoretical claims made by, Bayesian
explanations of behaviour. The main aim of this tutorial is to help facilitate
this broad accessibility. This is achieved by presenting a series of models
of an important task in perceptual research, the 2-alternative-forced-choice
task. In order to convey these theoretical claims, it is important to under-
stand how these models work and how they are evaluated, and so this tutorial
also acts as a primer to methods of Bayesian model evaluation. Sometimes,
this understanding of the details of a model and how they are practically
implemented is important to be able to understand and critique models, and
so Supplementary Code is provided to help in this way.
To best understand the claims made by Bayesian explanations of percep-
tion it is first worth outlining how Bayesian methods are used in alternative
contexts. The first is where a scientist may use Bayesian inference to evaluate
a data analysis model (Figure 1a). Examples would be general linear models
such as regression or ANOVA. These can serve as descriptions of the data, no
claims about the perceptual, cognitive, or neural processes that gave rise to
the data are being made. Kruschke (2015) provides a comprehensive overview
of using Bayesian methods for a wide variety of data analysis models.
Under a second approach, a candidate model is constructed to describe
processes that give rise to behavioural data (Figure 1b). While Bayesian
methods are used to evaluate the models, under this approach there is no
claim that Bayesian processes are occurring within the observer themselves.
This is perhaps the most common modelling approach where researchers
propose explanations for behavioural data and evaluate these through formal
modelling. Frequently, non-Bayesian methods are used in evaluating these
models, see Lewandowski and Farrell (2011) for a comprehensive overview.
However, it is becoming more common to describe and evaluate models using
Bayesian methods. The text by Lee and Wagenmakers (2014) is an excellent
resource for readers interested in constructing and evaluating a wide range
of models of this class.
The third approach, which is the focus of this tutorial, goes further to
propose that Bayesian processes occur within the brains of observers (Fig-
ure 1c). This has been termed by some the ‘Bayesian Brain’ hypothesis
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(Knill and Pouget, 2004; Doya et al., 2007; Colombo and Serie`s, 2012), and
has been applied across a wide range of domains in psychology. In the per-
ceptual domain, the core assertions are that: a) an observer has an internal
mental model which represents the processes that gave rise to their sensory
observations, b) that observers conduct Bayesian inference using their mental
model in order to infer probable states of the world from sensory data, and
c) that observers have prior beliefs over states of the world.
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Figure 1: Three contexts in which Bayesian modelling are used. Adapted with permission
from Kruschke (2011).
1.1. Bayesian observer models
A forward generative model, in the context of perception being Bayesian,
is an internal mental model which describes and simulates the processes tak-
ing place in the world that give rise to sensory observations (see Figure 2,
middle). Forward models allow ‘what if’ questions to be asked; if the world
was like this, how likely is it that a range of possible observations would be
observed. Forward models can be formalised by a likelihood term describing
the probability of observing some sensory data for a given state of the world,
P (data|world). This concise term is a simple summary of what will turn
out to be a much more elaborate set of descriptions or equations for each
particular modelling context.
However, observers do not have access to the true state of the world, they
have access to sensory observations of the world, and must infer likely states
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of the world based upon that sensory data (see Figure 2, right). This is
done by evaluating the the Bayesian posterior, P (world|data). This ‘inverse
problem’ is not trivial to solve because many different possible states of the
world could be consistent with the observed sensory data, most obviously
apparent in the case of visual illusions (Gregory, 1980). Bayes’ equation
specifies how to solve the inverse problem and make inferences about the
world given the data available,
P (world|data) ∝ P (data|world)× P (world). (1)
In words, the observer’s task of inferring beliefs about different possible states
of the world given some data (the posterior) is conducted by multiplying
the probability of observing that data for a given state of the world (the
likelihood term) with a belief about the plausibility of that state of the world
(the prior).
What has been described so far is one major component in Bayesian
Decision Theory which describes the way in which observers can arrive at
beliefs about the world. The next component, which will not be discussed
in this tutorial, translates this belief about the world into an action, taking
into account the possible costs or benefits of each action dependent upon the
true state of the world. Interested readers are referred to North (1968) and
Kording (2007) for introductions and to Maloney (2002) and Maloney and
Zhang (2010) for in depth information.
While it is the multiplication of prior and likelihood that is the essence of
what it means to conduct Bayesian inference, this simple mathematical oper-
ation is not the core theoretical appeal. Rather, if we accept that we do not
have direct access to the true state of the world, and the data are insufficient
to provide this knowledge unambiguously, then Bayesian inference becomes
appealing as the only principled solution to the inverse problem. Readers
are referred to recent texts for wide ranging examinations of the promise and
problems of Bayesian approaches applied to perception, cognition and action
(Glymour, 2001; Frith, 2013; Hohwy, 2013).
1.2. Optimal vs. suboptimal Bayesian observers
We can differentiate two subclasses of Bayesian models based upon whether
they are optimal or suboptimal (Ma, 2012). The Bayesian optimal observer
approach would claim that observer’s mental models of the world are veridi-
cal, and that their prior beliefs are matched to the statistics of the envi-
ronment. In hypothetical ideal observer models, observers are given precise
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of Bayesian inference. Everything we know about the
probabilistic generative model is captured by a joint probability distribution (left). The
generative nature of the model can be used to simulate (deduce) data observations given
an assumed state of the world, and to calculate the likelihood of observing some data given
this state of the world (middle). The model also allows the perceptual process to infer a
distribution of states of the world, given some observed sensory data (right). One example
would be a forward model (middle) that describes the process giving rise to sensory data
for a given world state P (data|world). Shaded nodes represent observed, known quantities.
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knowledge of certain aspects of the world in order to calculate the theoreti-
cal maximum performance. While these ideal observer models provide com-
pelling accounts of behaviour in perceptual similarity judgements (Ma et al.,
2012), covert attention tasks (reviewed by Vincent, 2015), visual working
memory tasks (Sims et al., 2012), visual discrimination (Geisler, 1989), and
perceptual research in general (Geisler, 2011), they are not always serious
explanations of human behaviour in all contexts. Instead, they act as im-
portant baselines, allowing the researcher to propose suboptimal observer
models (Geisler, 2003).
Another approach is that observers are Bayesian yet suboptimal (Beck
et al., 2012; Acerbi et al., 2014). The first reason for this suboptimality could
be that an observer’s internal mental model of the world is mismatched with
the actual generative process (the real world) which gave rise to their sensory
observations. Beck et al. (2012) argue that this is likely to be the case in
many real world tasks where reality is too complex to formulate a veridical
generative model. Low-level perceptual tasks, however, are generally simple
and it is perfectly reasonable to assume observers have accurate generative
models. Does this mean Bayesian Brain modelling is only usefully applied to
low-level perceptual tasks or phenomena? No, it is the task of the scientist to
infer how people may approximate the true generative process by a simpler
internal generative model.
A second reason for observers being suboptimal could be that their knowl-
edge is mismatched with the true state of the world. Real people have un-
certainty about the state of the world, and this is captured by their prior
beliefs about the world. How well these priors reflect the true uncertainty
about the world is another question (Vincent, 2011; Fennell and Baddeley,
2012).
1.3. Inferences made by modellers
While modelling can be a complicated endeavour, it is possible to define
some broad categories. This tutorial provides an overview of these broad
categories and acts as in introductory exposure to each. There are a number
of accessible texts which provide in depth coverage of these topics in the
context of data analysis (Kruschke, 2015; Gelman et al., 2013) and cognitive
modelling (Lewandowski and Farrell, 2011; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2014),
but this tutorial is focussed on applying these approaches in the context of
Bayesian Brain models.
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Describing the generative probabilistic model. The first task of
modelling from a Bayesian perspective is to define a probabilistic generative
model. This, as the name implies, is a model of the processes which generated
observed data, and provides a joint probability distribution which can then
be used in a variety of inference steps, such as the three listed below.
Generating simulated observer behaviour. One of the main advan-
tages of quantitative modelling in general is to make reliable and accurate
predictions of the logical consequences of a hypothesis. Trying to mentally
simulate a model’s predictions can be difficult, error prone, and only quali-
tative (Farrell and Lewandowski, 2010). We can use the generative aspect of
the probabilistic models to create simulated datasets and make predictions
of the model.
Parameter estimation/recovery. Having acquired some behavioural
data from a human observer one aim of an experimenter could be to infer
the values of the model’s parameters that are most consistent with the data.
This is commonly termed ‘fitting the parameters to the data’ but a more
accurate term would be parameter estimation (Tarantola, 2004, 2006). That
is, the Bayesian approach estimates a distribution of belief of how plausible
a whole range of parameter values are, given the observed data. But how do
we know that our parameter estimation process is reliable? As modellers, we
can calculate an observer’s responses for a set of parameter values that we
specify. We can then conduct parameter recovery, testing how well we can
infer the known parameter values just based upon the observer’s responses.
If parameter recovery does a bad job, then we will have to collect more data,
or refine the model’s formulation so that the data can more accurately inform
us of the true parameter values.
Goodness of fit to data. While the previous step of parameter estima-
tion shows that we can infer a distribution of belief over parameter values,
this does not yet inform us of whether the model is doing a good or a bad job
of accounting for experimental data. We can do this by using the generative
aspect of the model again by making model predictions where the parameters
are constrained by the data. This step of posterior prediction allows us to
plot the model’s predictions for a visual check.
1.4. Practical evaluation of Bayesian models
There are a variety of approaches in how we might practically evaluate
a probabilistic generative model (Jordan, 2004). The two methods we focus
upon here will be grid approximation and MCMC sampling (see Figure 3)
7
and they have advantages and disadvantages depending upon the modelling
context. Both methods involve calculating the joint probability of the model
parameters for a given set of latent parameter values and observed experi-
mental data. This is analogous to the non-Bayesian approach of evaluating
the goodness of fit of a model to data (e.g., sum squared error). However, the
Bayesian approach introduces priors over parameter values and replaces the
sum squared goodness of fit term with a data likelihood (see Myung, 2003,
for a tutorial on likelihood estimation).
Grid approximation evaluates the model for a range of possible values of
the parameters (Figure 3, left). The more parameter values evaluated, the
closer the posterior will be approximated. MCMC sampling takes a different
approach and instead attempts to draw many samples of the parameter values
in proportion to the model’s posterior probability (Figure 3, right). The more
MCMC samples generated, the closer these samples will approximate the true
posterior.
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is perhaps the simplest of many MCMC
sampling strategies (Cum and Greenberg, 1995). While a deep understanding
is not required, a basic familiarity is certainly advantageous. The posterior
probability of the parameters given the data are estimated based upon an
initial point in parameter space. The parameter space is explored by propos-
ing a new set of parameters by sampling from a distribution centred on the
current point in parameter space. Before each new proposed parameter vec-
tor is accepted into the list, acceptance criteria are defined based on whether
the posterior probability of the proposed sample is higher or lower than the
current sample. In the former situation, new samples are always accepted, in
the latter case, new samples are probabilistically accepted. Doing this means
that the number of samples returned from points in parameter space will be
proportional to the posterior density (eg. Figure 3, right). Readers inter-
ested in learning more of the technical details are referred to the algorithmic
implementation in the Supplementary Code, chapter 29 of MacKay (2003),
and to Kruschke (2015) who describes more sampling algorithms.
1.5. Overview of the tutorial
In the remainder of the tutorial, some of the core aspects of Bayesian
modelling will be demonstrated using the case study of the 2 alternative
forced choice (2AFC) task. Three different models of this task are described,
and used in order to demonstrate important points about the formulation
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Figure 3: A true but unknown posterior distribution (red) can be approximated (blue) by
evaluation over a grid of parameter values (left) or by drawing MCMC samples (right).
Drawing more samples than the 200 shown will result in a more accurate approximation
of the posterior.
and practical evaluation of Bayesian models of perception. Supplemen-
tary Code is available for readers to learn more about the practical eval-
uation of Bayesian models, and is available at https://github.com/
drbenvincent/bayesian2afc.
Model 1 shows how to formulate the SDT account of 2AFC in terms
of a probabilistic generative model. Grid approximation is used to demon-
strate how probabilistic generative models can be constructed and practi-
cally evaluated. MCMC methods build upon grid approximation and will
become particularly useful for more complicated models with more parame-
ters. However, we see that MCMC methods are approximate and necessitate
some extra diligence.
Model 2 formulates the SDT account (SDT) of 2AFC on a trial to trial
basis. It models the stimulus generation process as well as the observer’s
response selection. While the model is more complex, it allows modelling of
suboptimal aspects of behaviour such as response errors.
Model 3 is a Bayesian ideal observer of the 2AFC task, also formulated
on a trial to trial basis. The nature of the Bayesian optimal aspect of the
model becomes more apparent as it is a model of the causal generative struc-
ture of the 2AFC task environment. This forward model is then putatively
used by observers to make inferences about the state of the world. Subopti-
mal Bayesian inference is demonstrated through an observer with incorrect
priors of the state of the world.
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2. The 2AFC case study
The 2AFC task has played a crucial role in the psychophysical study of
perception. An experimental trial is simple: an observer indicates which of
two locations contains a signal item as opposed to a noise item (see Figure 4,
top). These items consist of simple visual features, such as the orientation
of a line, the size of a dot, or the luminance of a patch. Each response will
either be correct or incorrect, and the probability of responding correctly
decreases as the signal and noise items become more similar. By repeating
many trials while varying the difference between signal and noise items, a
psychometric function can be measured (see Figure 4, bottom). One reason
for this is that noise will corrupt the sensory measurements of the actual
stimuli being displayed, such that sometimes the identity of a signal and noise
items become confused and an incorrect localisation results (see Figure 5).
The psychometric function establishes the relationship between exter-
nal stimuli and behavioural responses. However, the problem that has to be
solved by an observer is how to infer the state of the world from the proximal
sensory measurement. How is this done, and what processes are involved?
Proposing models that relate the external stimuli to behavioural responses
allows us to make inferences about the internal information processing mech-
anisms and the observer’s internal percept. The aim here is to utilise a sim-
ple yet fundamentally important task to highlight some core theoretical and
practical issues associated with Bayesian explanations of perception.
One popular approach of modelling an observer’s performance in the
2AFC task is SDT (Green and Swets, 1966). This is a manifestation of
Statistical Decision Theory (Maloney and Zhang, 2010) which is closely re-
lated to Bayesian Decision Theory, where in the latter, observers have priors
over states of the world.
This simple 2AFC task is distinct from a number of other similar experi-
mental paradigms. An alternative paradigm allows speed accuracy tradeoffs
to be investigated by keeping the stimuli available until the observer re-
sponds. But in the simple version considered here, speed accuracy tradeoffs
are eliminated by only displaying the stimuli for a fixed and brief duration
(typically around 100ms) and by instructing observers to maximise the ac-
curacy (not the speed) of their response. The 2AFC task is also distinct
from the yes/no task which is commonly associated with SDT. The yes/no
task requires an observer to indicate if a signal item was present or absent,
whereas the 2AFC task requires the observer to indicate the location of a
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Figure 4: Overview of the spatial 2-AFC task. After central fixation, 1 of 2 stimulus
displays is presented for a brief duration (top) before the observer gives an unspeeded
response of whether they inferred the signal to be in location 1 or 2. By repeating many of
these trials, and by varying the signal intensity, a psychometric curve can be established
(bottom). Three psychometric curves are shown for different levels of observation noise
variance (see legend).
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Figure 5: Intuition behind SDT models of performance in the 2AFC task. Each point
(left) shows a simulated pair of sensory observations for an experimental trial. Red and
blue points label the signal location, which is unknown to observers. Dashed lines show
the observer’s decision threshold. The distributions of decision variables are shown (right),
with incorrect decisions shown by shaded regions.
signal which is present on each trial. A Bayesian data analysis model of the
yes/no task has been presented by Lee (2008), and Vincent (2015) reviews
similarities and differences of Bayesian Brain models AFC and yes/no tasks.
Before modelling may commence, the 2AFC task needs to be described
more formally. On each trial t, one signal item and one noise item will be
displayed, with true feature values of µS and µN , respectively. The difficulty
of the task will be related to the difference between signal and noise items,
which we will call the signal intensity ∆µ = µS − µN . The stimuli on each
trial can either contain a signal in the first position 〈SN〉, or in the second
position 〈NS〉. The probability that the signal item will occur in location 1
(Lt = 1) or 2 (Lt = 2), is determined by a spatial prior probability such as
p = [0.5, 0.5]. If there was no uncertainty associated with making observa-
tions, then x = {µS, µN}, or x = {µN , µS}, however, we will assume there is
normally distributed observation noise such that a single observation is de-
scribed as x ∼ Normal(µ, 1/σ2), where µ is either µS or µN depending upon
the signal location. When the observation noise encoding precision 1/σ2 is
not infinite, i.e., the noise variance σ2 is greater than zero, the distribution
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of observations x (over many trials) may overlap (see Figure 5), and thus the
performance of an observer to correctly indicate the target’s location will be
less than 100%. This 2AFC task can be repeated in T trials over C signal
level conditions such that we now have a list (vector) of signal intensity levels
∆µ = {∆µ1, . . . ,∆µC}. Equations featuring bold face (such as ∆µ) refer
to vectors over C stimulus intensity conditions, and non-bold face (such as
∆µn) refers to a single signal intensity condition. To summarise, T trials are
carried out at each of C signal intensity conditions, so a total of C×T trials
are conducted.
3. Model 1: SDT with Bayesian estimation
3.1. Constructing the probabilistic generative model for the 2AFC task
While the experimenter may know the signal location, 〈SN〉 or 〈NS〉,
an observer does not. The proposed optimal way for an observer to decide
(assuming equal encoding precision of signal and noise items) is to calculate
a decision variable d = x1− x2, and to respond that the target is in location
1 if this d > 0. This is equivalent to the observer responding to the location
with the highest valued sensory observation, hence it being called the Max
rule (Figure 5; Green and Swets, 1966; Wickens, 2002; Kingdom and Prins,
2009). The response threshold of zero is optimal under the assumption that
the signal is equally likely to occur in location 1 and 2. Because of the
experimenter’s knowledge, we can define xS and xN as the noisy sensory
observation at the signal and noise locations, respectively. On each trial, the
correct response will be given when xS > xN (or equivalently xS − xN > 0),
and so the probability of a correct response PC is simply the proportion of
times that this occurs, PC = P (xS − xN > 0). This can be calculated as
PCc = Φ
(
∆µc√
2σ2
)
(2)
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution (Kingdom and Prins,
2009). This cumulative normal is a psychometric function.
So far the relationships between these variables have been deterministic,
but the next part of the model examines the probabilistic relationship be-
tween the underlying probability of a correct response PC and the actual
proportion of correct responses k
T
, for a given signal intensity condition. The
variable k is the number of correct responses out of T trials for each signal
level, and the vector of correct responses over each signal intensity condition
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is k = {k1, . . . , kC}. Because each trial is a Bernoulli trial (a biased coin flip,
with PC being the probability of a correct response), the number of correct
responses k will be Binomially distributed, so the generative model for this
task is
kc ∼ Binomial(PCc, T ) (3)
where c = 1, 2, . . . , C. The proportion of correct responses observed in an
experiment k
T
is merely a particular draw from a distribution of possible
proportion correct values. An observed proportion correct could be consis-
tent with a range of different underlying probabilities of responding correctly
(PC) and this must be inferred from the data, which will be done in Sec-
tions 3.3 and 3.4.
We will assume a uniform prior distribution P (σ2) over a suitably large
(albeit arbitrary) range from 0-1000.
σ2 ∼ Uniform(0, 1000) (4)
This probabilistic generative model is represented in Figure 6. This form
of graphical model representation is appealing both because they convey
a lot of specific information about the model in a compact manner, but
are also accessible and interpretable (Jordan, 2004; Lee and Wagenmakers,
2014). The large box in Figure 6 is called a plate, and represents a for-loop,
showing that the nodes within the box are duplicated a number of times, in
this case over C signal intensity conditions. Figure 7 provides a description
of different types of nodes used in probabilistic generative models.
3.2. Using the model to generate behaviour
We can use the forward generative model to simulate behavioural ob-
servations. In our context, the observed data are the number of correct
responses k and the state of the world is our experimenter-defined parame-
ters {∆µ, σ2, T}. Essentially this forward model allows us to calculate what
pattern of data one would expect to see if these are the true parameters. If
the forward model was deterministic then a given set of parameters would
always give rise to the same number of correct trials. However, the generative
model is stochastic and so the model will predict a distribution of number
of correct responses for a given set of parameter values for each signal inten-
sity level examined. We will use the ability of the generative model in this
way in a later section, but here we take one sample from the distribution
14
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Figure 6: A representation of Model 1. A simple graphical model shown twice for gen-
erating simulated data (left) and for parameter estimation (middle). Ideal observers are
assumed to have precise knowledge of the true signal and noise levels (thus ∆µ), which
were defined by the experimenter and so are observed variables in both the generative and
parameter estimation steps.
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Figure 7: Types of nodes used in graphical model diagrams. Nodes can represent ob-
served vs. latent variables, continuous vs. discrete valued variables, or those which are
probabilistically vs. deterministically related to their parent (input) nodes.
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Figure 8: Inferences made with Model 1. The dataset of performances (points) were used
to estimate a posterior distribution over the noise variance parameter σ2 = 1 (right).
The posterior distribution of noise variance was used to generate a distribution of model
predicted performance (left).
shown in Equation 3 for each signal intensity (i.e., simulate one realisation
of an experiment). Drawing a sample from this distribution (repeating for
each signal level) is very easy and can be done with built in functions which
generate random numbers from the Binomial distribution.
Throughout this paper, simulated observers will have observation noise
variance of σ2 = 1. Having generated simulated response data from an
observer (see Appendix A.2 for details), an empirical psychometric function
can be plotted (points in Figure 8a).
3.3. Parameter estimation with grid approximation
In a real experiment, a human’s encoding precision will not be known, and
we as experimenters will have to solve the inverse problem to infer what this
is. A common modelling approach is to find a single best fitting parameter
value (also called a point estimate). However, in a Bayesian approach we
estimate an entire distribution specifying how much we believe in a range
of different possible parameter values, given the observed data. We can
do this with the probabilistic generative model, we can calculate the joint
probability of the model for a given set of data observations and parameter
values. In our example this joint distribution is P (σ2,k, T,∆µ). We can
compute this straightforwardly because we can break down (factorise) the
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joint distribution into a series of simple conditional probability distributions
(see Appendix A.1).
P (σ2,k, T,∆µ) = P (σ2)× P (k|PC, T )
= Uniform(σ2; 0, 1000)
×
C∏
c=1
Binomial(kc;PCc, T )
(5)
The first expression is the prior probability for any given σ2 under consid-
eration (Equation 4), and the second expression is the data likelihood for
given values of k, T and σ2 (Equation 3). The deterministic node PC in this
example, does not have a probability associated with it, but is simply calcu-
lated (see Equation 2). This parameter estimation step can be implemented
easily, see Supplementary Code.
Based upon the simulated dataset used throughout the paper (see Ap-
pendix A.2), Figure 8b shows the posterior distribution over σ2 calculated
with grid approximation (as in Figure 3, left). The mode of this posterior dis-
tribution, which is the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate, is not exactly
equal to the true value of σ2 = 1, not because of any error but because the
estimation is based upon only 100 trials worth of data for each signal level.
The 95% credibility interval (see horizontal line in Figure 8b) overlaps with
the true value, meaning that we believe that there is a 95% probability that
the true value of σ2 is contained in this region. Running the same procedure
for a different set of experimental data would result in a different posterior
distribution of belief over the encoding precision. The choice of signal in-
tensity levels will also affect how precisely we can estimate σ2, for example,
testing signal levels at floor or ceiling performance are less informative at
localising the horizontal shift of the psychometric function, so will tell us less
about σ2.
Because the prior over σ2 is uniform, this parameter recovery step could
be viewed as likelihood estimation. The posterior will be proportional to the
likelihood and the mode of the posterior will equal the maximum likelihood
estimate. Readers are referred to Myung (2003) for a tutorial on maximum
likelihood estimation in general and to Kingdom and Prins (2009) and Kuss
et al. (2005) for parameter estimation with parametrically defined psycho-
metric functions.
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3.4. Parameter estimation with MCMC sampling
Parameter estimation can also be achieved through MCMC sampling
methods. Given that we can calculate the model posterior for a set of ob-
served data and particular parameter values (Equation 5), the Supplementary
code shows how the Metropolis Hastings algorithm can be used to generate
MCMC samples from the posterior distribution. Conducting the parameter
estimation with MCMC sampling results in very similar predictions to that
achieved for grid approximation in Figure 8 (results shown in Supplementary
Figure 1).
To test whether the parameter estimate was sensitive to the particular
span of the uniform prior distribution over σ2, the parameter estimation
procedure was repeated multiple times with the uniform prior spanning the
range 0 to 100, 1000, 10000, 100000. The resulting parameter estimate (mode
and 95% CI of the posterior) was unaffected (not shown), so for all practical
purposes the range of the prior distribution did not affect the inferences
made.
In order to gain confidence that the samples returned from the MCMC
algorithm accurately reflect the true posterior distribution, the general ap-
proach is to repeat this process multiple times, running multiple MCMC
chains with different initial parameter values. Visualising MCMC chains
(Supplementary Figure 4) showed that convergence was achieved quickly.
Quantitative checks such as the Rˆ statistic (e.g., Gelman and Rubin, 1992)
can help confirm convergence to the posterior distribution. This was found
to be the case for this model, with the statistic Rˆ = 1.0 (see Supplementary
Figure 3).
Flegal et al. (2008) highlight that because inference with MCMC is ap-
proximate, there is a need to evaluate the accuracy of MCMC estimates.
The standard error of 30 repeated MAP estimates of σ2 were calculated as
a function of total number of MCMC samples (see Figure 9). We can see
that, for this particular model and dataset, estimates are roughly centred on
the value estimated with Model 1 (dashed line) and that we start to have
confidence in the estimated MAP estimate of σ2 with a total of 106 or more
total MCMC samples.
3.5. Model predictions
Having obtained a distribution of belief over parameter values consistent
with the data, we also need to establish to what degree the model provides a
good or a bad fit to the data. This can be done by using the generative process
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Figure 9: Uncertainty in posterior mode of MCMC-derived parameter estimation. Data
points (top) show the posterior mode, conducted multiple times on the common dataset,
as a function of total number of MCMC samples calculated (excluding burn-in period).
The dashed line shows the estimated posterior mode, evaluated with grid approximation.
In this case, a large number of MCMC samples need to be generated to obtain reliable
inferences.
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again as we did in Section 3.2. However rather than specifying an exact value
for the observer’s encoding precision, we can use the posterior distribution
over values consistent with the data that we obtained in the previous section.
We can also use the model to make predictions of number of correct trials
for additional signal intensity levels which were not used in the experiment,
∆˜µ. This is done in a similar way to the steps in Section 3.2, just with the
additional interpolated signal intensity levels, P (k˜|∆˜µ, σ2, T,k). Code to
predict the outcome of one simulated experiment is also easy to numerically
evaluate. By repeating this many times, the posterior predictive distribution
will be approximated by these samples drawn, and a distribution of predicted
number of correct trials will result (Figure 8a, shaded region).
4. Model 2: A trial-to-trial SDT model
A trial-to-trial version of the SDT model can be constructed as a proba-
bilistic generative model (see Figure 10). Trial-to-trial models of the 2AFC
task have been investigated by DeCarlo (2012) and for the yes/no detection
procedure (Ma et al., 2011; Mazyar et al., 2012, 2013). One reason to create
trial-to-trial models is that they more clearly represent the events occurring
in an experiment, and are thus more interpretable. Another reason is that
more specific predictions can be generated: rather than modelling averaged
performance, we can calculate how a model observer would have responded
given the very same sequence of signal locations that an actual experimental
subject was exposed to.
The model in Figure 10 consists of a number of simple steps. On a given
trial t for a given signal intensity condition c, a signal is present in location
L (1 or 2) with equal probability. This gives rise to noise-corrupted sensory
observations xct which depend upon the observation noise variance σ
2 and
the signal intensity ∆µc. The observer is assumed to respond R that the
signal is in location 1 or 2 with certain probabilities. This is governed by a
probability vector m which maps noisy sensory observations x to response
R. This probability vector incorporates both response biases and lapse rates.
Response bias is modelled as in DeCarlo (2012), meaning the observer re-
sponds to location 1, if x1−x2 > b. If b > 0, then the observer has a response
bias favouring location 2. Response biases are often ignored, especially with
AFC tasks with more than 2 locations, not on any theoretical grounds, but
because of difficulties in expressing and evaluating the model. This simpli-
fication is not without consequence, published parameter estimates can be
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Figure 10: Model 2, a trial to trial Max-rule observer. The model describes the generative
process giving rise to sensory observations and how these observations map onto observer
responses. The model is first used to generate simulated signal locations and observer
responses (left). This simulated data are then used to conduct parameter estimation and
to generate model predictions (right).
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substantially altered when response biases are accounted for, thus potentially
affecting research conclusions (Garc´ıa-Pe´rez and Alcala´-Quintana, 2011).
The model also incorporates lapse rates. Response errors are modelled
by responses being randomly selected on a small proportion λ of trials. This
is also achieved through the deterministic node m implementing the max
decision rule. The value of the node mst will be a pair of numbers represent-
ing location 1 and 2, [1 − λ
2
, λ
2
] or [λ
2
, 1 − λ
2
] depending upon which location
contains the highest valued sensory observation. For example, if according
to the Max rule the signal is decided to be in location 1, then for a lapse rate
λ = 0.05 the probability of responding to location 1 and 2 is [0.975, 0.025].
4.1. Formulating the model
Beyond very simple models it can become counterproductive to manually
generate code to evaluate the model’s joint posterior and to implement an
MCMC sampling algorithm. Instead, we use one of a number of advanced
MCMC sampling packages available. The JAGS software package (Just An-
other Gibbs Sampler; Plummer, 2003) was used to formulate the graphical
model and to conduct the inference. JAGS is well-developed, free, and avail-
able for Mac, PC, and Linux platforms. The probabilistic generative model
(Figure 10) is translated into a JAGS model specification (see Supplemen-
tary Material and Supplementary Code). For more examples, readers are
referred to the JAGS user manual (Plummer, 2003), and the books by Lee
and Wagenmakers (2014) and Lunn et al. (2012).
4.2. Model 2 results
For this model, the experimenter is aware of the true signal locations L
used in the experiment, the observer’s responses R, and the signal intensi-
ties ∆µ. The experimenter must infer the latent parameters σ2, λ, and b.
Figure 11 (right) shows posterior distributions over the noise variance, lapse
rate, and bias parameters. The histograms show the marginal distributions
for each variable, and we can see that for this dataset the 95% credibility in-
terval of the marginal posterior distributions clearly includes the true values,
indicating successful recovery of all parameter values. One of the advantages
of this Bayesian analysis however is we have a full distribution over param-
eter values, and so we can examine whether there are any trends between
parameters (see the density plots).
Figure 11 (left) shows the observer’s performance data (points), the model’s
posterior predictive distribution (similar to Figure 8 left), but we also have a
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Figure 11: Inferences made with Model 2. The model predictions are shown by the
posterior predictive distribution (grayscale intensity, left). Red 95% confidence intervals
show a second posterior predictive distribution, see text. Parameter estimation for the
noise variance, lapse rate, and decision bias parameters are shown (right).
second posterior predictive distribution (red lines). This latter set of model
predictions answer the question: what responses would the model predict
given knowledge of location of the signal (L) and the response (R) on each
trial? We can see that these predictions are more precise (narrower 95%
credibility intervals). Models that make more specific predictions are ap-
pealing as it gives a greater chance that experimental data will conflict with
the predictions, so the model can be tested more stringently.
5. Model 3: A Bayesian optimal observer model
Model 3 is a Bayesian optimal observer of the 2AFC task (see Figure 12).
While SDT and Bayesian approaches are similar, a number of differences can
be identified (Ma, 2012). Firstly, while the SDT model can have a spatial
bias term which will achieve the same effect, it is not an explicit prior over
the signal location. It mirrors the top half of Model 2 in that it is just a
generative model of what gives rise to the observer’s observations on each
trial. The Bayesian optimal observer is then assumed to use this generative
model of the task to conduct inferences over the state of the world (signal
location) given the sensory observations. Optimal observers are also assumed
to have perfect knowledge of other key variables (Figure 12, red asterisks),
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Figure 12: Model 3, a Bayesian ideal observer. A dataset of locations and sensory observa-
tions can be simulated (left). The model can then be used to infer the observers’ inferences
about the true state of the world L∗ (right). Red asterisks represent quantities known
precisely by a theoretical ideal observer. A real human observer would have uncertainty
over those quantities, imparted by experimental task instruction or previous experience.
here, the signal intensities ∆µ, their own observation noise variance σ2, and
the probability of a signal appearing in each location, eg. p = [0.5, 0.5].
Predicted behaviour of an observer was calculated in two steps. The
first generates a dataset of true signal location L and noisy observations x
(Figure 12, left). In the second stage, the model now switches meaning to the
observer’s internal mental model of what generated their observations. This
can be used to make inferences about the true stimulus location L∗ given the
sensory data x (Figure 12, right). On one trial, L∗ is the observer’s posterior
belief of the signal location, and observer is assumed to respond to the most
probable location,
R = argmax
n
L∗n. (6)
Figure 13 shows predicted performance of an optimal observer and a
suboptimal observer. The optimal observer has the correct, unbiased prior
belief that the signal will appear in location 1 and 2, p = [0.5, 0.5]. However,
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Figure 13: Predicted psychometric functions of Model 3. Points represent performance
calculated with MCMC methods. Filled black circles and solid line correspond to an
unbiased observer, squares and dashed lines correspond to a biased observer who has the
incorrect belief that targets have a 75:25% spatial prior.
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if the observer’s prior over signal location is incorrect (p = [0.75, 0.25]) then
it will have diminished performance until the signal intensity provides so
much information about the signal’s location that the effect of the incorrect
prior is overcome.
Just as with Models 1 and 2, Model 3 can be used to make inferences
about an observers σ2 (see Supplementary Figure 7). However, because
of the form of the model, it was not as straightforward to calculate this
posterior distribution over σ2. For example, the model does not allow si-
multaneous observation of the true signal locations and observer responses
R. There is in fact no node in the model for R, this has to be calculated
outside of the JAGS model because evaluating Equation 6 requires access
to all of the MCMC samples describing the posterior over L∗. The solu-
tion used to calculate the posterior distribution over σ2 (see Supplemen-
tary Figure 7) was as follows. Grid approximation over many values of σ2
was conducted. For each value, the posterior was evaluated with a Bino-
mial likelihood, a discrete uniform prior over k, and a continuous uniform
prior over σ2: P (kc|∆µc, σ2, T ) = Uniform(kc; 0, 100)×Uniform(σ2; 0, 1000)×∏C
c=1 Binomial(kc;PCc, T ). Where PCc = f(σ
2,∆, µc) was calculated by as-
sessing the performance of the observer over 106 simulated trials (steps 1
and 2 demonstrated in Figure 12). This process was found to be too compu-
tationally demanding to conduct with JAGS, and so the evaluation of PCc
used manually written code instead of JAGS (see Supplementary Code).
6. Discussion
This tutorial has provided an introduction to a range of important con-
cepts underlying the evaluation of Bayesian explanations of perception. Some
of these, such as simulating data, parameter estimation, and calculating
model predictions are important regardless of whether or not one uses Bayesian
methods of evaluation, or if a model claims that perceptions involve Bayesian
inference. More in depth treatments of these concepts with non-Bayesian and
Bayesian approaches are provided by Lewandowski and Farrell (2011) and
Lee and Wagenmakers (2014), respectively. The review also explored issues
relating to SDT and Bayesian explanations of perception with the important
2AFC task as a case study. The first model introduced the SDT account of
the task and demonstrated important aspects of Bayesian model evaluation.
The second model which was equivalent to the first (except for the inclusion
of bias and lapse rate terms), showed that describing the events on a trial-to-
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trial basis, leading from noisy stimuli through information processing to be-
havioural response was more intuitive. This second form of model is perhaps
most useful in providing a template for modelling other perceptual tasks. Fi-
nally, a Bayesian ideal observer more clearly demonstrated some of the more
important theoretical claims underlying Bayesian explanations of perceptual
phenomena. Namely that observers conduct inference about the state of the
world, based upon priors over world states, noisy and sometimes ambiguous
sensory information, and an internal probabilistic generative model of the
world.
The modeller has a number of options when it comes to the practical eval-
uation of the models. Both grid approximation and MCMC sampling require
the joint probability distribution of the model to be evaluated (demonstrated
with Model 1). For more complex models it is perhaps more convenient
to use purpose built MCMC sampling software to do this task. However
the current algorithms and software implementations do have limitations, it
can become computationally demanding to evaluate large models with many
nodes. For example, using JAGS it was not possible to calculate the optimal
observer’s performance with more than a few thousand simulated trials (Fig-
ure 13, points), but it was perfectly possible to construct hand-written code
to evaluate performance over millions of simulated trials (Figure 13, lines).
No doubt, these issues will soon disappear given the pace of development
in MCMC sampling algorithms. One of the key limitations of grid approxi-
mation, however, is that it becomes too computationally demanding as the
number of model parameters increase. More than 3-4 parameters becomes
infeasible to conduct on current desktop computers. However, some extra
care is required with MCMC approaches. Figure 9 clearly demonstrated
the approximate nature of the inference being conducted by the MCMC
approach. Given that research conclusions drawn from data rest on MCMC-
derived parameter estimates, it would seem prudent to have confidence in
the accuracy of the MCMC estimate (Flegal et al., 2008, and Figure 9). Sec-
ondly, one needs to confirm convergence of the MCMC chains using both
visual and quantitative checks such as the Rˆ statistic (Gelman and Rubin,
1992). Third, care is also needed in situations where MCMC chains con-
tain autocorrelation, such as in the parameters b and λ in Model 2. While
some advocate discarding some chain values to decrease this autocorrelation,
others recommend against this (Link and Eaton, 2011).
Bayesian explanations of perceptual phenomena have been rising in popu-
larity, in part this is because they allow direct and quantitative testing of the
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compelling constructivist approach (Gregory, 1980). To determine the extent
to which this Bayesian Brain hypothesis can provide insights into perception
will require that a broad range of researchers can not only understand the
theoretical claims made by Bayesian models of perception, but also have the
ability to construct and test the limits of such explanations. Visual depiction
of probabilistic generative models aid in conveying these theoretical claims,
avoiding reader attrition sometimes caused by dense mathematical descrip-
tions alone (Fawcett and Higginson, 2012). Rather than this necessitating
a more verbose, less efficient, less accurate model description (Fernandes,
2012), generative model diagrams offer accessibility alongside the compact
accuracy of mathematics. Use of MCMC sampling algorithms also ‘black
boxes’ some of the practical evaluation processes, which again allows focus
to be placed on the models and their theoretical claims. It also lowers the
barrier to entry such that more people can engage in Bayesian modelling.
If this is combined with emerging good practice for making research code
publicly available (Peng, 2011; Morin et al., 2012; Ince et al., 2012; Kubilius,
2014) then the barriers to entry are lowered further. The more researchers
probing the limits of Bayesian explanations of perceptual phenomena the
better.
Appendix A. Appendix
Appendix A.1. Bayesian Networks
The probabilistic generative models considered in this paper are Bayesian
networks, where variables are defined (deterministically or probabilistically)
in terms of their inputs (or parents). Put formally, Bayesian Networks (also
known as belief networks) are a subclass of probabilistic generative mod-
els where the joint distribution between all of the model variables can be
expressed as a function of their parents (Barber, 2012),
P (x1, . . . , xN) =
N∏
i=1
P (xi|pa(xi)). (A.1)
Where pa(xi) represents the parents of the variable xi. If a variable xi has no
parents, then P (xi|pa(xi)) is represented by a prior distribution over values
of node xi. Bayesian networks form directed acyclic graphs in that the re-
lationship between variables proceeds in one direction, and no circular loops
can be drawn through the network.
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Appendix A.2. The simulated dataset
Model 2 was used to create a common dataset of responses in a simulated
2AFC experiment. There were 10 signal intensities, logarithmically spaced
between 0.01 and 10. The true parameter values were σ2 = 1, T = 100,
b = 0, λ = 0.01, and p = [0.5, 0.5]. For each signal intensity, 100 simulated
trials were run. The raw data was transformed from correct or incorrect on
each trial, to proportion correct k
T
for use with Model 1 which does not model
individual trials. The proportion correct responses are shown as points in
Figures 8 and 11. This dataset is comparable to one we may obtain from a
real experiment with the exception that we do not know the true values of
the latent parameters σ2, b, λ, or p.
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